SC removes gender bias from labor pact

The Supreme Court has granted in part a petition of female   flight attendants of the country’s flag carrier Philippine Airlines (PAL) seeking to remove a gender bias provision in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that sets the retirement age for women five years earlier than that for their male counterparts.

The High Court Third Division, in a 19-page decision written by Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta, reversed and set aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 31, 2005 and March 7, 2006.

In the same decision, the High Tribunal remanded as well the case, Civil Case 04-886,  to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City and to continue the proceedings with deliberate dispatch on the allegedly discriminatory provision of the CBA against female flight attendants.

Records showed that on July 11, 2001, PAL Inc. and the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) entered into a agreement incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005.

Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP collective bargaining agreement on compulsory retirement provides, “Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five [55] for females and sixty  [60] for males.”

In a letter dated July 22, 2003, petitioners and several female cabin crew manifested that the aforementioned agreement provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded equal treatment with their male counterparts.

On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a special civil action for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Branch 147 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which the lower court granted on August 10, 2004.

PAL filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration of the order overruling its objection to the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. It also prayed that the petitioners’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be denied and the petition be dismissed.

On September 27, 2004, the regional trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent or any of its agents and representatives from further implementing Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA pending the resolution of the case.

Aggrieved, PAL, on October 8, 2004, filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying that the order of the regional trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued without and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On August 31, 2005, the appellate court granted the respondent’s petition. It ruled that the regional trial court has no jurisdiction and ordered the lower court as well to dismiss the case, giving credence to the argument of PAL that the issue was a labor problem.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated March 7, 2006.

In reversing the Court of Appeal’s ruling, the High Court gave merit to the argument of the petitioners that the issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code, but rather requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

“Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW,” the High Court said.

“Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice, not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC [National Labor Relations Commission],” it added.

The High Court also held that the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do not have the power to determine and settle the issues at hand as they have no jurisdiction and competence to decide constitutional issues relative to the questioned compulsory retirement age.

The High Tribunal pointed out that the dispute in the case at bar was not between FASAP and PAL, but between PAL and several female flight attendants who questioned the alleged biased provision on compulsory retirement.

But in the same decision, the High Tribunal noted that the question as to whether Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is discriminatory is a question of fact and “the Supreme Court is not a trier of fact.”
Such case, the court explained, would require presentation and reception of evidence by the parties in order for the trial court to ascertain the facts of the case and whether said provision violates the Constitution, statutes and treaties.

“A full-blown trial is necessary, which jurisdiction to hear the same is properly lodged with the RTC. Therefore, a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition for declaratory relief is just and proper,” it said. –WILLIAM B. DEPASUPIL REPORTER, Manila TImes