The eventual demise of the communist insurgency in the Philippines (Conclusion)

Poverty reduction

The government’s Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (KALAHI) programs, aimed at reducing poverty in the country, has reached 12,826 KALAHI barangays and in turn, helped reduce insurgent recruitment. These programs, which improved the quality of lives of the people and developed public confidence in government, include construction of water systems, farm-to-market roads, day care centers, health centers, flood control systems, footbridges, public markets, pump irrigation and barangay electrification. Today, there are already 41,722 barangays electrified and only 258 un-electrified. KALAHI projects also include animal dispersal, agro-forestry, fish culture and other livelihood opportunities.

Cooperation of LGUs

The cooperation of the local government units (LGU) in counterinsurgency efforts undeniably decreased the people’s support to the communist cause. Bohol is a perfect example of an LGU leading counterinsurgency and of a “carrot” dominated approach. Gov. Erico Aumentado declared the province insurgency-free in 2005, after an elaborate poverty reduction and rebel returnee programs convinced the insurgents to shift their loyalty from the CNN to the government. Cebu Gov. Gwen Garcia also formed and led an anti-insurgency task force that succeeded in suppressing insurgency in the province. The two governors’ twin formula was collaboration with all sectors and effective governance.

AFP’s shift to hearts and minds war

The military shifted its strategy from attrition to “hearts and minds” war giving emphasis on soft power (development and humanitarian efforts). The AFP created the National Development Support Command to execute the government’s Kalayaan Barangay Program (KBP) where soldier-engineers construct school buildings, water systems, farm-to-market roads and bridges in conflict areas to convert them to peaceful and progressive communities. A total of P3.4 billion has been spent on 1,723 KBP projects benefitting 797 barangays throughout the country. The AFP also continues to dispatch Peace and Development Teams in rural areas to help local officials hasten development and to hold dialogues with families of rebels who are better off outside the CNN. The AFP’s focus on civil military operations (e.g medical missions, disaster rescue and relief operations, literacy programs, environmental protection) is winning people’s loyalty.

With a better quality of life in the barrios, with no authoritarian ruler, with no valid issues to take advantage of, and with dwindling support from sympathizers, students, mayors, businessmen, land owners and farmers, the communist movement’s relevance continues to fade. The insurgency has in essence withered.

The future of CNN

My sense tells me that we are on a countdown when the days of communism in our country are numbered… Matthew Jennings, 2008

The end is near for the CNN. It is losing its fighters and support networks. It has metamorphosed from an ideological movement into a bandit group. Its appeal and influence are ceaselessly waning as the country sustains economic growth. Real GDP growth rates in 2003-09 averaged 5.2%. Areas which used to be rebel bailiwicks, like Camarines Sur, Bohol, Cagayan Valley, Negros Oriental and Davao City, are now the country’s leading tourist destinations. Regions which used to endure rebel intimidations, like Northern Mindanao, Soccsksargen and Eastern Visayas, have been experiencing high gross regional domestic product growth rates for years.

The sorry state of the CNN today puts the movement in a position of weakness. With the refusal of CNN leadership to return to the negotiating table, the most viable course of action for government, to lethally knock out the CNN, is to push for local peace talks. The CNN sees peace talks (at the national level) as a tool to attain belligerency status and a component of protracted war. Even today, its demand for a coalition government (power sharing) is uncompromising.

Localized peace talks had been the government’s fall back position every time the CNN withdrew from the negotiations. This was done by three Presidents in 1987, 1999 and 2005. Today, the Social Integration Program (SIP), a form of a local peace talks where government negotiates with individual rebels or through their families, is succeeding in reducing NPA strength and in changing the lives of former rebels, who resolved that staying in the CNN organization is a hopeless thing. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Annabelle Abaya says the SIP “has proven to be the most effective counterinsurgency weapon without guns and bullets, attracting rebels to surrender in 2009 to avail of government livelihood scheme.” She adds that over 2,500 former communist rebels were given various government financial and livelihood assistance amounting to P65.62 million in 2009. At least 480 more rebel applicants are under process, and this year more negotiations are underway. Almost certainly, this trend is irreversible.

Without the NPA foot soldiers to extort and terrorize the people, the CNN will simply fade into oblivion. Today, it is fighting for its life.

(The author is a graduate of Master in Strategic Studies at Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, and Master in Public Management at the University of the Philippines.) –Brig. Gen. FRANCISCO N. CRUZ Jr. AFP, Commander, Civil Relations Service Armed Forces of the Phil (philstar.com)