OFFICIALS from the Department of National Defense have been debating lately on the proposal to raise the current compulsory retirement age of soldiers from 56 to 58. The debates are in relation to the DND’s current effort to craft measures to reform the present military retirement system.
The present retirement scheme requires the compulsory retirement of members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on reaching 56 years of age, or 30 years of active service, whichever comes later. This is the scheme set out under Presidential Decree 1650 dated November 8, 1979 amending Presidential Decree 1638 which then provides that compulsory retirement be pegged at age sixty, or 30 years of active service, whichever comes earlier. Prior to these decrees, the governing law on AFP retirement was Republic Act 340 enacted on July 26, 1948. Under this law, AFP members are compulsorily retired upon reaching sixty years old or 30 years of active service.
Determining the appropriate point (be it at a specific age or accumulated years of service) in which a member of the Armed Forces can be considered ripe for retirement should not be taken lightly. Knowing who to let go at a certain point is crucial in the sound management of human resources.
Admittedly, I find the current AFP retirement scheme flawed in some respects in terms of bringing undesirable consequences to morale and leadership effectiveness in the organization. The adverse consequences of the flawed retirement scheme, (particularly the system of compulsory retirement at age 56 or 30 years active service, whichever comes later) are best observed in the AFP officer corps.
Consequences on officer corps
The AFP by nature is a hierarchically structured organization. As one goes up the ladder, leadership slots available for fill-up become few. Definitely, it is presumed that these slots are reserved only to those who are worthy and deserving, and only those having potential to steer the organization to greater heights should be appointed.
Ironically, the current retirement scheme has not been responsive to the demands of the AFP hierarchical structure in terms of having only the best qualified to occupy top leadership posts. In fact, what it has only done so far is to give undue advantage to those who joined the service as officers at a younger age.
Likewise, I have some doubts that the Defense Department’s proposal to raise the compulsory retirement age by two years would eventually bring about the supposed primary rationale in reforming the present military retirement system, that is, to make the organization more effective by maximizing its pool of available talents.
Our policy makers may find the following thoughts and observations on the consequences of the current system worth their consideration.
Under the current system, officers are compulsorily retired upon reaching their 56th birthday. With this set-up, the AFP tends to lose a number of good people who have the talent, experience, and wisdom, honed and accumulated through their years of dedicated service in the organization, at a relatively young age of 56. In the corporate world, top level executives serve beyond this age, and are most often the one making the difference in their respective companies.
In another instance, the system forced the AFP to retain officers who (in the absence of the appropriate words to describe them) have reached their “level of incompetence.” These are officers who cannot be given higher assignments or positions commensurate to their seniority in the service mainly because they were beaten to such positions by others who are of a higher caliber and outstanding performance. In spite of these circumstances, by virtue of the current law, they cannot be eased out until they reach the age of 56. Thus they continue to serve although with diminished enthusiasm and drive. They have practically become deadwoods. The accumulation of deadwoods in time will cause the upward movement in the promotion ladder stagnate. This will eventually result in having a relatively old Armed Forces officer corps or an Armed Forces composed mostly of old junior officers where the average age is above 45 – too old to be assigned to face current threats in situations that needs young, able-bodied troops to run after a highly mobile, agile guerrilla or terrorist force.
Frankly, I fail to see the logic behind the proposal to raise the retirement age to 58. Some sources say that the main consideration is to address the increasing arrears in the pension payment of retirees. If indeed this is so, then it seems to be an attempt to solve one problem by creating another more serious problem. Carrying out this proposal would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the AFP.
My take in the revision of the retirement scheme is to let officers retire compulsorily upon reaching 30 years of active service or around 52 years old for those who reached the rank of colonel and below, while the retirement age for those who have reached the “star” ranks or brigadier general and above should be staggered. This scheme of a staggered retirement age can be illustrated as follows:
An officer who attains the rank of Brigadier General (one star) shall be given an additional three years stay in the service for him to attain his promotion to Major General (two star). Upon promotion to Major General, subject officer will again be given another three years to serve and subsequently the opportunity to attain the next higher rank of Lieutenant General within the period. Failure to attain the next higher rank within the specified period however would cause the compulsory retirement of subject officer.
As to becoming the Chief of Staff, all Lieutenant Generals shall have two years to prove their mettle in their respective position until one is finally chosen and appointed.
The appointed Chief of Staff would earn the rank of General (four stars) and serve for three years unless sooner terminated.
My proposed retirement scheme is an offshoot of the following conceptualized principles:
– It is acknowledged that men have varying capabilities, and motivations; thus there will only be a few achievers who will occupy positions of higher responsibilities.
– Lower ranking individuals who failed to make it to higher positions retire at an earlier age because it is presumed that they have already demonstrated the peak of their capabilities during their younger years where more premium is given to physical capabilities, commensurate to the demands of their jobs as frontline troopers.
– Generals (or their counterparts in the enlisted ranks) on the other hand retire older because at this stage higher premium is given on one’s maturity, wisdom, and experience. The service at this point demands less of their physical capabilities.
– The possibility of having deadwoods or those who just passively wait for their retirement in the organization shall lessen, considering that those who have manifested peak performance in the early stages of their career shall be eased out. This will then allow upward movement of relatively younger but deserving officers.
My proposal may not be perfect, but it is worth considering if we want to come up with a retirement scheme responsive to the demands of having a more effective AFP. –ALEXANDER YANO, Manila Times
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