Regular, not special

Can ordinary courts assume jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the terms and conditions of employment under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)? This is the question resolved in this case of Patty and several other female flight attendants-labor union members in an airline company (PAL).

The dispute here concerned the CBA signed between PAL and the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers in said airline company.

Section 144 (A) of the PAL-FASAP CBA fixes the compulsory retirement age for females at 55 years and for males at 60 years. Believing that this provision is discriminatory against the female flight attendants, Patty and eight other flight stewardesses wrote PAL for equal treatment and for removal of gender discrimination in said provision.

On July 29, 2004, in view of the pending negotiations for a new CBA with PAL, Patty and her group representing the female flight attendants filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with a Prayer for TRO with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The thrust of the petition is Section 144(A) of the CBA which is allegedly discriminatory against the female flight attendants, in violation of: the Constitution (Section 14 Article II); the Labor Laws on right to equal work and employment opportunities with men (PD 442, Article 3), on discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment (Article 135 Labor Code); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ratified by the Senate in 1981. They thus asked the RTC to declare said Section 144 (A) invalid, null and void.

PAL however asked for the dismissal of the petition. It contended that the dispute concerns the terms and conditions of employment specifically the retirement age which is beyond the jurisdiction of regular courts and within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrators Panel which has the power to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and implementation of the CBA.

But on August 9, 2004 the RTC issued an order upholding its jurisdiction and thereafter issued a TRO, then a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of Section 144 (A) pending resolution of the case. Was the RTC correct?

Yes. Jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this case the allegations and relief prayed for show that the issue raised is whether Section 144 (A) of the CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the CEDAW. The subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation exclusively cognizable by the RTC pursuant to Section 19 (1) of BP 129 as amended. Being a civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or their CBAs. Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.

The grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators do not have the power and competence to determine, settle and decide constitutional issues relative to the questioned compulsory retirement age. While the trend is to vest administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization to insure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them, it should not deprive the courts of justice of their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do not require any special expertise or training for their interpretation and application. Otherwise the creeping take-over by administrative agencies of the judicial power vested in the courts would render the judiciary virtually impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it by the Constitution (Halaguena et. al. vs. PAL, G.R. 172013, October 2, 2009) –Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star)

Note: Books containing compilation of my articles on Labor Law and Criminal Law (Vols. I and II) are now available. Call tel. 7249445.

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E-mail at: jcson@pldtdsl.net